INTRODUCTION
While the "preservation of public goods" as such is not a typical role for competition law, 1 the application of this body of law to so-called knowledge goods presents particularly complex issues. Knowledge does not fit neatly into a framework of analysis that treats property as either private or public. Because knowledge is nonrivalrous in character, anyone may adopt it for his or her own individual purposes in the raw state of affairs. 2 The state may accordingly decide to stimulate the creation of knowledge by providing private parties with legal means of appropriating it, as for example, by laws protecting trade secrets and confidential information, by enforcing contractual agreements, or by enacting the exclusive rights of intellectual property regimes. In that event, competition law intervenes to ensure that private parties do not either jointly or individually, by the exercise of market power, extend that appropriation beyond the limits allowed by law. * Hanns Ullrich is Professor of Law at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy.
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As a rule, one cannot contractually exclude private competitors from access to public infrastructure facilities, although the status of radio and broadcast frequencies presents a borderline case. However, competition may intervene in the reverse situation by insisting that certain private property must be made accessible to competitors under the "essential facilities" doctrine. This doctrine has lately attracted considerable attention because so many infrastructure facilities have become privatized. See German Act Against Restraints of Competition of August 26, 1998 (GWB), v. 26,7,1998 (BGBl. I S.2546 Competition law thus responds to fears that private ordering might otherwise
unduly encroach on what ought to remain a free resource for independent innovation or that it might transform the process of appropriating knowledge into actual control of markets. In so doing, competition law performs a critical but rather traditional role, one that concerns the much discussed interface between the protection of intellectual property laws, whose exclusive rights seem to confer legal monopolies, and free intrabrand competition. 3 The major goal here is to safeguard the incentive and reward rationales of intellectual property protection while at the same time controlling the risks of an undue extension of legal exclusivity. Its doctrinal and jurisprudential approach has shifted over the years from immunizing IPR-based restraints on trade from antitrust challenges to subjecting the exercise of IPRs to the general rules of competition law as they apply to any property-related restraints of competition.
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In this article, the IPR-antitrust interface is considered only to the extent that it is reflected in the competition rules embodied in the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 ("TRIPS Agreement"). 5 The TRIPS Agreement expressly addresses some of the better known methods by which IPRs may be abused in order to secure a private appropriation of public goods. For example, this sometimes occurs when rights holders impose "no challenge" clauses in licensing agreements. 6 Parts I and II of this article discuss this general topic from both the domestic and international perspectives. We must also consider the extent to which the TRIPs provisions on competition law apply to phenomena typical of the "new economy," in which IPRs have led to an ever broadening privatization of intangible public goods. 7 One question, for example, is what the TRIPS Agreement might say about the use of certain intellectual property as an "essential facility" 8 or as a "raw material" or interface 9 for access to various peripheral and after-markets. Because legislators often fail to properly define the limits of exclusive property rights, 10 the exercise of these rights in new situations, and especially with regard to new technologies, attracts scrutiny under competition law, with a view to preventing anticompetitive market foreclosure. This topic is discussed in Part III of this article.
Still other questions concerning the impact of the TRIPS Agreement merit attention. One is whether the competition rules in that Agreement cover the many roles that technological property 11 now play with regard to innovation that affects both the new economy and the broader economy in general. Another question is whether the TRIPS Agreement's rules on competition adequately reflect modern policy approaches to innovation-related restrictions on competition, which tend to favor the creation rather than the diffusion of new technologies. These questions are also addressed in Part III of this article.
Because both old and new approaches to competition policy vary from country to country, there is a further question of how to deal with such diversity. To the extent that the TRIPS Agreement promotes a globally harmonized intellectual property 7 See, e.g., Case C-241/91P & Case C-242/91P, RTE, ITP v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 743 (Magill TV Guide) . 8 See supra note 1; see also Helmuth Schröter, i n KOMMENTAR ZUM EUROPÄISCHEN WETTBEWERBSRECHT Art. 82, annot. 263 et seq (Helmuth Schröter et al. eds. 2003 Agreement. The consequences of these distinctions, and of this self-imposed limitation, will be discussed later.
B. Principles
Three guiding principles emerge from the competition rules set out in the TRIPS R. 775 1985, 2281 (1985) . Indeed, coercive licensing does not only foreclose alternative licensing opportunities of the licensee, but also undercuts its interest in innovation efforts of its own, and, therefore, the IPR-system's incentive to individually innovate. Moreover, market power is at odds with the IPR system as it undercuts its balanced operation by transforming legal exclusivity into an economic monopoly. 
The Requirement that National Competition Policy be TRIPS-Consistent
Conversely, Articles 8.2 and 40.2 limit the Members' sovereign power to prescribe national competition policy by requiring that measures adopted to control abusive or anticompetitive practices must be "consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." 38 This requirement of TRIPS consistency represents more than a mere limitation on remedial action, which is always subject to a principle of proportionality. 39 Rather, the consistency requirement concerns the substantive scope of IPR-related competition rules.
As such, it does not establish a standard of evaluation for restrictive practices that 
The Dissemination Concern
Reliance on exclusive intellectual property rights to stimulate investment in new technology poses a twofold economic dilemma. First, the exclusive rights, which provide incentives to innovate in order to reap market-induced rewards, may also block the development of improved, related or complementary technology. This is known as the vertical innovation dilemma. Second, exclusivity may impede optimal exploitation of protected technology, since by definition, optimal exploitation will occur only under conditions of full intra-brand competition, at least if interbrand competition is not perfect. This is known as the horizontal diffusion dilemma. To some extent, both domestic laws and the TRIPS Agreement address the vertical innovation dilemma in a general fashion by imposing a disclosure requirement on patented technology, 49 although there is no similar requirement for copyrightable technology, notably computer programs. 50 The problem is further mitigated by and 9, and especially whether the application of this right has led to abuse of a dominant position or to other interference with free competition which would justify appropriate measures being taken, in particular the establishment of non-voluntary licensing arrangements"). This could lead to a compulsory licensing rule in the interest of competition, and it would virtually transform protection from a property to a liability regime. Nevertheless, the weight of these concessions should not be underestimated, given that they were made in recognition of the Members' sovereign authority over competition policy. They were also apparently premised on the same donor -recipient relationship that characterized the preceding discussions and disputes concerning the proposed Code of Conduct for Technology Transfer, 58 which complicates the issues.
The appendix-like character of article 40, as well as its defensive wording and embryonic rules, make it sufficiently clear that it was not devised as an invitation to counterbalance increased IP protection by a pro-active licensing and technology transfer strategy, but rather as a cautious form of containment. It does not directly seek to ensure realization of the technology transfer objective set out in Article 7, it merely promotes the attainment of that goal by resort to the rules of competition law governing domestic markets.
These rules constitute a sphere of national policymaking comparable to decisions to grant compulsory licenses 59 or to admit parallel imports, 60 two other areas of major concern for developing countries. While acknowledging that it cannot prevent members from invoking such rules, the TRIPS Agreement nonetheless keeps them within certain limits.
II. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION RULES AFTER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

A. The New Reality
The tension between innovation and dissemination in the TRIPS Agreement becomes pronounced with regard to the competition rules governing the unilateral exercise of exclusive intellectual property rights. It has been aggravated by a shift from an economy built around a multiplicity of independent innovators to an economy built on collaborative research and pooled incentives to innovate. 199 (1977) . 59 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 31.
60 Id., art. 6. and they need not be limited to cases of absolute or relative market power alone. 68 See the combined effect of the broad concept of reproduction and the limitations on reverse engineering in Art. 4 (1) (a) and Art. 6 of EU Directive 91/260 on the legal protection of computer to use their IPRs to maintain ever closer control over the modes of exploiting these new subject matters of protection in their disembodied states, and not just in tangible material embodiments as in the past.
1.Innovation and the Unilateral Exercise of Exclusive Rights in the Information
The disembodied technological subject matter itself-rather than some particular embodiments of it-thus increasingly became the product that was directly sold on the market. This is true, for example, in biotechnology to the extent that inventions are not transformed into goods, but are exploited as research tools or directly applied as a technology. It is particularly true of computer software and databases when licensed (as they normally are) as services rather than distributed as physical products.
In all these cases, use of the protected matter is subject to strict contractual limitations and direct quantitative control; and there is no possibility of freeing trade from these constraints and promoting intra-brand competition by resorting to the doctrine of exhaustion. 69 On the contrary, any potential network effects-though dependent in scope on the functional properties of the subject matter at issue-may become fully internalized, to the benefit of proprietors. the form of tangible embodiments, have yet to be worked out. There are at least two important economic consequences that merit to be mentioned here.
First, in the absence of tangible embodiments subject to the rules of appropriation and consumption that traditionally reflected the market value of any given technology, proprietors will seek to fully capture the value of the informational products by controlling the specific amounts and purposes of use, either directly by virtue of their exclusive rights or indirectly by virtue of contract stipulations. 71 Second, when the protected subject matter is commercially exploited in this disembodied state, the rights holders may effectively capture all the returns from all uses on different market segments without spillovers or other uncontrolled social benefits. In other words, the rights holder may privatize all the multi-functional or multi-purpose qualities of knowledge that were previously available to the public when distributed in tangible embodiments.
It is this latter effect that has particularly attracted the attention of competition law. Risks of market foreclosure due to access limitations, and of enhanced market power are, of course, recognized, 80 but they need not be dealt with here in detail. The point rather is that the supposed defects of the intellectual property system, or, more precisely, of its individualistic orientation and its emphasis on single proprietors is overcome by institutional arrangements, which may or may not be market-driven, and these are used to support innovation. Whether this approach also implies group innovation or not will depend on whether a given pool is built around convergent, component, or complementary technologies. At the very least it certainly means that the incentives are shifted away from exclusivity to group access, if not membership.
Moreover, the balance between stimulating innovation and promoting the dissemination of technology may tilt toward the former once pools and crosslicensing are tolerated as innovation-enabling arrangements, not as systems of technology propagation. They build upon the IP system, but, at least in part, they modify its primary incentive rationale, and to this extent they reach beyond the confines of the TRIPS Agreement.
Similar considerations apply to cooperative research and development agreements.
As an increasingly common way of promoting and facilitating technological Second, while cooperative R&D is driven by techno-economic necessity rather than by a desire to escape techno-legal dependencies (a motive for pools), it is directly related to intellectual property protection, both as regards the use and acquisition of rights. The intellectual contributions to, and results of, cooperation can only be defined, delimited and attributed by virtue of exclusive rights, which protect them, and this creates an additional incentive to acquire and enlarge protection individually by sophisticated patent strategies deployed prior to and during the various phases of cooperation. At the same time, the joint R&D effort itself constitutes a productive source of intellectual property, which is to be held in common or cross licensed among partners, and possibly even to third parties.
Competition laws favor cooperation by means of safe-harbor provisions, low-key enforcement or outright exemptions. 84 They also generously permit intellectual property arrangements that enable partners to safeguard their relative competitive positions during and after the cooperative ventures, which may be enhanced by the jointly produced R&D results. Here again, and much more overtly, a layer of group competition policy is superimposed on the individualistic, exclusivity-based orientation of the intellectual property system. Yet, as competition rules evolve more into "coopetition" rules, the shift to problems of access and exposure to collective rivalry seems likely to result in tighter antitrust control only at the threshold to market dominance. The first observation that follows from this summary of current trends is that the principles of competition embodied in the TRIPS Agreement are obsolete. While concerns about technology transfer persist, the Agreement's emphasis on postinnovation transfers by means of bilateral licensing transactions, i.e., the diffusion of technologies into additional markets, corresponds to a marginal component of real world issues.
From competition policy to innovation policy
Insofar as present-day competition law affects licensing at all it mainly deals with either problems stemming from the distribution of protected, relatively disembodied subject matter as a product or with the acquisition of technology at the top-end of the innovation chain. The real issue is early access to information, and it is raised mainly in the context of cooperation, concentration, and the control of market power.
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This state of affairs reflects a shift from independent technological competition by individuals to industrially coordinated innovation, and to competition for full market control, 87 which accompanies a change in the function of intellectual property law.
been, IP law's current role is mainly to provide ancillary support for incentives to innovate that are not just set by market forces, 88 but that are determined by coordinated group efforts and by the political acceptance of private control over the infrastructure governing certain information technologies.
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This longstanding shift of competition law enforcement from safeguarding free and individual competition to merely controlling the relative efficiency of competitor transactions corroborates the innovation policy rationale, which underlies both the tolerance of coordinated group efforts by IPR-related antitrust law today, and its reluctance to regulate anything short of the excessive exercise of actual market power.
Moreover, this efficiency based innovation policy rationale increasingly governs the application of competition rules to the traditional area of bilateral licensing transactions, including so-called "anticompetitive" technology transfers. 
The European Union's Example
The recent reform proposals regarding block exemptions for technology transfer agreements under Art. 81 (3) of the EC Treaty may serve to briefly illustrate both the overall trend toward allowing, if not fostering, group-supported innovation, and the 88 The incentives are set by market opportunities, the profit potential of which may be more fully controlled in the information economy by intellectual property than in the hardware economy, but they are determined by the economic nature of the subject-matter sold on the market (e.g., its general qualities such as simplicity and reliability, or its information specific qualities, such as network effects, compatiblity etc.), that is, by the demand it may attract, and not so much by the legal terms of protection, see Ullrich, supra note 4, at 367 et seq., 381 et seq. (citing authorities). In this context efforts to define, for competition law purposes, the limits of intellectual property in accordance with the economic nature and effects of the subject matter, as is frequently advocated (see D Guidelines, taken together, must accordingly be viewed as complementary and equally efficacious. They spell out a unitary and coherent policy, laid down in the Evaluation Report, which affirms an almost one-dimensional focus on realizing 98 In addition, Art. 5 of the draft block exemption regulation ( supra n. 95 ) excludes certain stipulations from the block exemption (but does not invalidate the agreement as a whole from the exemption), that oblige the licensee to grant back to the licensor exclusive licenses for severable improvements or to assign to him such improvements, or oblige him to abstain from challenging the validity of the licensed property rights. The perspective is that of competition as a dynamic process, with market power regarded as both ephemeral and necessary as a foundation for broad ranging innovation. The surprising result is that we are back to the reasonable reward doctrine, both conceptually and practically, in that the innovation incentives or the reward constitutes a promise stemming as much from a goal-oriented application of the antitrust laws as from the protection of intellectual property law. Conduct that restrains competition has become part of the innovation process, over and above the The licensor is viewed as master of the game, whether or not he has market power, and the licensee is seen as an adopter, or at best, as an adapter. However, this approach ignores the possibility that the licensee might transform the licensed technology to suit his own needs and those of the market segment on which he operates, or that he might otherwise diversify its application, develop its potential, and create added value by contributing complementary technology or service know-how of his own. So long as this approach implements only a broad concept of intra-brand competition, which, in effect, is left to the control of patentees, and ignores the propensity for development of interbrand competition, the real potential for harm to competition is thus analytically and legally suppressed.
Whatever the merits of this policy orientation may be, 108 from a TRIPS perspective it implies much more than merely extending IPR-related competition policy beyond the licensing restrictions that the Agreement embraces. Here we are faced with a concerted effort in major markets to allow restrictive licensing agreements to reinforce the IPR-based protection of innovation opportunities and profits, with a view to enhancing the productive and innovative capacity of the IPR owner and to spurring the licensee to join in and cooperate with the former's projects.
The end result tends to undermine the political balance that was struck by the approach, a pro-active competition policy with a focus on innovation itself constitutes a powerful means of regulating competition. It invites emulation by other countries that are already in, or wish to join, the innovation race, and it helps to disadvantage those countries that are technologically less advanced. This is true not only in economic terms, in the sense that such a competition policy might actually strengthen the innovation process, but also as a political fact of life. Because a pure dissemination rationale for competition policy can easily be criticized as being sort of parasitic and as hindering innovation, whereas a cooperative relationship between licensor and licensee might advance it, the dissemination approach to competition policy simply looks weaker than the innovation approach in political terms.
Given the overall framework of the GATT/WTO Agreements, of which the TRIPS Agreement is an integral part, the size of national markets becomes the basis for trade negotiations on market access and on ancillary considerations of market protection or regulation. In this context, countries possessing market power will have considerable leverage to push other countries to abandon dissemination-oriented competition rules as an impediment to investment, in exchange for access to markets.
This leverage is facilitated by the fact that, under the TRIPS Agreement, IPRrelated competition policy is thought mainly to concern limiting domestic intellectual 112 Put differently, it will lose in "regulatory competition", whether as a result of a "race to the bottom" or of a "race to the top" is a circular question in that it refers back to the issue of what is the right competition policy. See MONOPOLKOMMISSION, SYSTEMWETTBEWERB, SONDERGUTACHTEN, sub. 4.1 (1998) (pointing to the increased risks of "races to the bottom" precisely in case competition policy is instrumentalized for specific policy purposes). 113 See supra note 46. Little if any use has so far been made of rules against discriminatory conduct, which, under national law, apply to enterprises having relative market power. Conversely, from the perspective of innovation-oriented countries, access to other markets by virtue of dissemination-based competition rules normally is not an issue.
On the contrary, they would like to control these markets too, so as to further protect and bolster their own innovation efforts. The very reasons that led them to require "adequate" intellectual property protection abroad by bringing the TRIPS Agreement into the GATT/WTO framework will induce them to support, and, if possible, to export an innovation-oriented competition policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Innovation-oriented competition policy extends largely beyond the narrow framework of the competition rules set out in the TRIPS Agreement. Unlike these rules, it follows an affirmative rather than a defensive strategy, and it does so on all fronts rather than only with respect to IPR-based restrictions. By its very objective, such a competition policy will supplement or expand rather than counterbalance the exclusivity effects of intellectual property protection. From the perspective of transnational globalized markets, which nonetheless remain territorially separable by virtue of national intellectual property laws, 115 and which are economically different, the system's logic as well as the trade logic of such a competition policy tends to produce both extraterritorial conflicts and pressures for an internationally applicable uniform approach.
Within the TRIPS framework, an innovation-oriented competition policy would only in exceptional cases allow authorities to limit excesses of IP protection, namely, when they attract regulatory attention precisely because they obstruct innovation. This limits. An innovation-biased competition policy also tends to undermine the dissemination-oriented technology transfer objective of the TRIPS Agreement, and, generally speaking, the goal of technology access that has become so crucial today.
The innovation/dissemination alternative regarding IPR-related competition policy faces, of course, a potential conflict of its own. Because the innovation approach becomes more promising the larger the markets are to which it applies, collision with the dissemination approach will bring with it problems of a territorial split: dissemination claims will most likely be asserted by Members that are specifically affected by foreign dominance of innovation. Thus, there might arise a typical globalization problem in that multinational industry's interest in operating on and benefiting from transnational markets conflicts with the Nation States' interest in protecting and promoting industry in domestic markets. Once again, the problem reaches beyond TRIPs in that the innovation approach is all-embracing whereas the dissemination approach mainly focuses on licensing restrictions, at least as conventionally conceptualized in ex post adoption of certain technologies rather than in terms of ex ante participation through early information access.
One should not indulge in false hopes that the conflicts between, and the biased effects of, these two approaches may readily be overcome by "regulatory competition," or by the harmonization of rules. The problem with both approaches is not any inherent theoretical or practical weakness, but precisely their policy orientation.
However well and objectively reasoned each may be in terms of economic theory, these policy approaches are chosen in accordance with polito-economic interests, either directly by rule-makers and governments, or indirectly by administrative or judicial authorities as they implement what they (tacitly) feel or (expressly) consider those interests to be. If economic globalization and the concomitant interdependency of global, regional and national markets with respect to their regulatory needs make international harmonization of competition law desirable, 117 it can hardly succeed if this endeavor is based on either the interest-biased trade rationale of the TRIPS Agreement 118 or on a policy approach to competition law, whatever its tint may be.
More precisely, if one were to extend the TRIPs Agreement, or to apply its trade mechanisms to IPR-related competition policy in general, the likely outcome would be that, instead of consensual competition rules limiting possible excesses of IP protection, the innovation-oriented approach would prevail. A better route to harmonization might accordingly be to return to old-fashioned principles, and to place more reliance on legal norms that focus on the virtues of a free-enterprise market organization rather than on the likely outcome of an efficiency-enhancing arrangement of competition.
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Needless to say, a proposal to reorient competition policy towards a system of essentially legal values is not likely to engender a mass movement in the near future.
At a lower level of abstraction, where one might focus on the restrictive licensing of technological property, for example, it might prove more beneficial to try to overcome the innovation/technology-transfer conflict by abandoning the implicit assumption of an innovator/follower relationship.
Basically, a licensing agreement is a negotiated transaction, which poses a dilemma. However desirable licenses are both for licensor and licensee, they enable the licensee to eventually compete with the licensor. Hence, the licensor must be allowed to keep the licensee at a competitive distance or else the former might refuse to grant a license altogether.
Restrictive licensing is, therefore, often a precondition to licensing. All that antitrust control of the transaction must achieve is to ensure whether, and to what extent, these conditions appropriately occur, and to limit restrictive licensing accordingly. This is a free-market approach, which may be reconciled with a fairness approach to competition policy. 120 However, unlike the innovation-oriented approach of IP-related competition policy, this approach directly addresses a problem of maintaining competition rather than masking the existence of such a problem and contributing to the persistence of a relationship of innovation dominance and technological dependence.
